Deep in Libya’s Sahara Desert, in the sunbaked town of Sabha, a ragtag group of gunmen loyal to one of the country’s two rival militias agreed to show Timothy Michetti their most prized weapons. Michetti, an experienced investigator for a London-based company that tracks the sources of small arms in conflict zones, traveled there on a hunch this past August. Local fighters, he reckoned, might have some of the shoulder-held anti-aircraft missiles that disappeared when rebels ousted Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi in 2011.
In the sweltering heat, the gunmen unveiled a small arsenal: four Russian-made SA-7 missiles and two later models of the SA-16 variety. The heat-seeking missiles are capable of shooting down civilian airplanes.
The fighters said they acquired the weapons from nomadic smugglers on their way to illicit weapons bazaars in neighboring Chad. But after comparing the missiles’ serial numbers to those in his company’s database, Michetti confirmed his hunch: These had been Qaddafi’s arms.
The missiles had no grip stocks or launchers, which rendered them unusable, but that wasn’t much of a relief. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of working Libyan shoulder-held missiles remain unaccounted for, U.S. and United Nations officials say. And some have probably fallen into the hands of Daesh militants, U.S. intelligence sources tell Newsweek. They add that as Daesh continues to exploit Libya’s four-year civil war between two main rival factions, the group is likely to use these weapons as it fights to widen its strategic foothold in Libya to include the country’s oil fields. There’s some evidence the group already has.
No one has downed a passenger plane using stolen Libyan missiles, known in military parlance as manpads or man-portable air defense systems, yet the likelihood that Daesh now has these weapons in Libya means the group or its affiliates could be well-equipped to strike at civilian aircraft in Africa or Europe, U.S. officials say. “These missiles are very portable and easily smuggled,” says a senior State Department official who leads a special U.S. team tasked with securing the Libyan missiles. “All it takes is for one to get through.”
Despite the dangers these Libyan missiles pose, the Obama administration has effectively stopped trying to locate and destroy them, State Department officials tell Newsweek. The primary reason: It’s too dangerous to go looking for them in Libya.
It’s unclear how many missiles remain at large. According to both U.S. and U.N. officials, Qaddafi accumulated an estimated 20,000 shoulder-held manpads during his four decades in power. Yet these officials stress that attrition, poor maintenance and the NATO bombing campaign during the 2011 revolution reduced that number by the time the dictator was overthrown. Not long after Qaddafi’s fall, President Barack Obama dispatched the special U.S. team to Libya, which located and destroyed roughly 5,000 missiles. But the team leader, who spoke on condition of anonymity in order to discuss a sensitive security issue, acknowledges he has no idea how many manpads are missing. “There’s a large number still there in Libya, where some of the larger militia groups still maintain the stocks that they originally took control of back in 2011,” he says. Others are in the hands of Libya’s smaller militant groups, and arms traffickers have smuggled some out of the country to feed the conflicts in Syria, the Sinai, Nigeria and Mali. “We might never know where they went,” the team leader adds.
On September 11, 2012, the manpads team suffered a major setback. Muslim militants attacked a secret CIA station in Benghazi, killing four Americans, including Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens. The loss of the CIA post, which had been tracking the whereabouts of Qaddafi’s looted weapons, eliminated one of the team’s critical sources of intelligence. The team pulled out of Libya less than two years later, when the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli closed down as security in the country deteriorated.
“Because it’s an active conflict zone, the U.S. team has no ability to go into Libya to locate and secure manpads,” says another team member. “Frankly,” he adds, “we have no leverage in the middle of a conflict to ask people to give up weapons.”
These days, team members work from a State Department annex in Washington, helping other governments in North Africa and the Sahel secure their weapons stocks. In an odd turn of events, the State Department has turned to several European-based private groups to carry out one of its other long-standing missions in Libya—locating and destroying mines left over from World War II.
Some observers suggest the administration gradually shifted its attention from finding the missing manpads to the war in Syria and the nuclear deal with Iran. “There was a huge flurry about the missiles right after the fall of Qaddafi,” recalls Rachel Stohl, an expert on small arms at the Stimson Center, a Washington think tank. “Then it was quiet for about two years. When we began seeing evidence that the missiles were showing up in Mali and other countries, the buzz returned. But since then, it’s fallen off the radar because of other, higher priority issues. And that’s troubling. These weapons can cause catastrophic damage to a civilian or military aircraft, killing hundreds of people.”
It’s unclear why no Libyan combatants have used the looted missiles to target a civilian airliner. Some analysts note that many of the country’s armed groups have no military training and don’t know how to operate the missiles. More important, they add, the men who control Libya’s two biggest militias and aspire to lead the country aren’t interested in downing a civilian plane, which would likely halt flights in and out of country. Libya’s criminal gangs don’t want the airports closed because they depend on them for smuggling. And with missiles fetching as much as $12,000 on the black market, the militias prefer to sell them when they need cash, notes Savannah de Tessières, a member of a U.N. panel that is also investigating the whereabouts of the looted weapons.
In Egypt, however, anti-government militants haven’t shown such restraint. In January 2014, Muslim fighters belonging to a group called Ansar Beit Al Maqdis used what Egyptian and Israeli officials say was a looted Libyan shoulder-held missile to shoot down an Egyptian military helicopter in the Sinai, killing five soldiers. Later that year, the group pledged its obedience to Daesh. This past November, Daesh’s Egyptian affiliate took credit for planting a bomb aboard a Russian passenger jet, killing all 224 passengers and the crew. The attack marked the affiliate’s shift to Daesh’s indiscriminate killing of civilians.
U.S., European and Arab officials now fear the Libyan civil war may lead to Daesh missile attacks against civilian planes in North and West Africa, as well as in Europe. The chaos in Libya has allowed Daesh to carve out a 150-mile enclave along the country’s central Mediterranean coast, with the city of Sirte at its center. The Pentagon says the group has as many as 6,500 fighters in the country, but other intelligence sources say the group’s ranks are swelling rapidly, putting the number of Daesh combatants in Libya at 10,000.
U.S. intelligence officials say the group’s growing presence in Libya is part of a larger strategic plan. As Daesh loses territory and oil revenue to coalition forces in Syria and Iraq, its leaders view Libya as a redoubt it can fall back on, a new source of oil money and a base from which it can spread its influence across North and sub-Saharan Africa. From Libya, these sources say, Daesh can also piggyback on the refugee flow north across the Mediterranean to strike at Europe.
As part of that strategy, Daesh has targeted Libya’s oil installations. One goal, says Patrick Skinner, a former CIA officer and now a principal at the Soufan Group, a security and intelligence consultancy, is to torpedo a power-sharing agreement between the country’s two main factions. How to split the country’s oil revenues is a contentious part of the negotiations. “If Daesh can cripple the country’s oil industry,” he says, “there’s a lot less incentive for the factions to form a government.”
Another aim is to replenish its coffers. In recent weeks, Daesh fighters took control of two strategic towns near Sirte, giving the group an unobstructed path to Libya’s oil fields in the south. As long as there is no unity government, Skinner says, there is little chance the two main militias will be able to stop the Daesh advance. “They have momentum, which is one thing you never want a terrorist group to have,” he says. “They’re all in.”
For more than a month, Obama has been under pressure from his military and national security aides to launch a major bombing campaign in Libya against Daesh. So far, he’s resisted, opting instead to conduct targeted airstrikes on the group’s commanders and one of its training camps along the Tunisian border. There are reports, however, that a multinational force, made up of troops from Italy, Britain, France and Spain, is poised to take on Daesh in Libya, with the U.S. providing special operations troops, as well as logistical and air support, among other things. But the Americans and the Europeans won’t agree to the operation until Libya’s rival factions form a unity government.
In the meantime, some of the more unsettling predictions about Daesh in Libya may prove prescient. In February, Daesh said it shot down a Libyan government MiG-23 fighter jet west of Benghazi as it bombed an unaffiliated militia. The group released a video of the attack, which the internationally recognized government in Tobruk confirmed. After analyzing the video, U.S. intelligence officials say it appears Daesh used a missile to bring down the aircraft. Daesh claims it has downed two other Libyan warplanes with missiles since January, but the government insists both crashed because of “technical problems.”
If the next plane is a civilian airliner, that excuse may not fly.